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Human existence and quality of life depend on the environment. It is evident that everyone has an interest 
in using the environment and protecting him- or herself from risks or harm to the environment. However, it 
is not clear how this interest has to be guaranteed by rights. One possibility is the recognition of an indepen-
dent material enforceable subjective right to environment. In June 2010, the Supreme Court held that such 
a right cannot be derived from the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia and can emerge only if criteria 
for the quality of the environment and everyone’s obligation to tolerate environmental impacts can be fi xed 
in the law. The General Part of the Environmental Code Act (GPECA)*1 entered into force on 1 August 2014, 
and its §23 sets out a subjective right to environment. The purpose behind this paper is to examine the basis 
for that right and analyse its scope and contents to determine whether it satisfi es the criteria outlined by 
the Supreme Court. 
1. The basis for the subjective 
environmental right in the GPECA
1.1. The framework of international and EU law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) does not feature a subjective environmental right and 
does not emphasise the importance of a supportive environment for enjoyment of the rights enshrined in 
the declaration. The environmental aspects of human rights are also not refl ected in other classical human 
rights instruments. At the time of their codifi cation, knowledge of environmental problems was limited and 
other issues were at the centre of concern. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
was adopted as a response to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the rise of communism.*2 
Awareness of environmental issues rapidly increased in the decades following the Second World War. 
This led to the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration (1972), whose fi rst principle stipulates: ‘Man has the 
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that 
ɲ Keskkonnaseadustiku üldosa seadus. – RT I, ɳɹ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɲ,ɲ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.
ee/en/eli/ɶɲɸɱɷɳɱɲɶɱɱɲ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɳ S. Kravchenko, J.E. Bonine. Interpretation of human rights for the protection of the environment in the European Court of 
Human Rights. – Pacifi c McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal ɳɱɲɳ (ɳɶ) / ɲ, p. ɳɵɹ.
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2016.24.04
Kaarel Relve
The Subjective Right to Environment in the General Part of the Environmental Code Act
33JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 24/2016
permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations.’*3 
Regional human rights conventions and national constitutions adopted after the Stockholm Declaration 
usually mention a right to environment.*4 A n exceptional reference to the right is found in the Århus Con-
vention, which was drafted under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.*5 
Article 1 of that convention stipulates that each party thereto has to guarantee certain procedural rights to 
the public in order to contribute to protection of the right of every person of present and future generations 
to live in an environment adequate for his or her health and well-being. In other words, the Århus Con-
vention does not expressly state that the right exists but does refer to it as an accepted fact. However, it is 
doubtful that there is consensus on the existence of such a material right, let alone on its precise contents.*6 
International attention has been directed primarily at the relationship of the environment with already 
recognised human rights rather than proclamation of a new right.*7
This process of ‘greening of rights’ is also evident in the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The text of the European Convention on Human Rights does not refl ect environmental concerns. 
However, the Court considers that convention to be a ‘living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions’.*8 It has found violations of several articles of the conventions in connection with 
environmental matters, most notably Article 8, which sets out the right to respect for private and family life. 
Nonetheless, the Court has stressed that there is no explicit right referred to in the convention to a clean 
and quiet environment and that environmental human rights are not given special status in weighing of 
interests under Article 8.*9 Also, Article 8 does not protect against general deterioration of the environment 
if there is no harmful eﬀ ect on a person’s private or family sphere.*10 
The EU treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights do not recognise a subjective material 
right to environment. However, the EU is party to the Århus Convention and environmental procedural 
rights are provided for under EU directives and regulations. Substantive environmental issues are also 
extensively regulated in EU secondary law, primarily by directives. The directives set out requirements for 
Member States in order to protect the environment and public health and to ensure the functioning of the 
internal market. The directives do not explicitly confer material rights upon individuals, but, according to 
the doctrine of direct eﬀ ect, a person in a dispute with a public body of a Member State may rely directly on 
only those provisions of directives that are unconditional and suﬃ  ciently precise.*11 Many environmental 
requirements fail this test because they set out general obligations that leave signifi cant discretion to Mem-
ber States in implementing them. However, certain environmental quality provisions are directly eﬀ ective. 
The Court has held that whenever the failure to observe the measures required by the directives that are 
related to air quality and drinking water, where these are designed to protect public health, could endan-
ger human health, the persons concerned must be in such a position that they can rely on the mandatory 
rules included in those directives.*12 It is not clear which members of the public (if any) could rely on other 
ɴ Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Available at http://www.unep.org/documents.
multilingual/default.asp?documentid=ɺɸ&articleid=ɲɶɱɴ (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɵ UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoy-
ment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment. J. H. Knox. ɳɵ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɳ (A/HRC/ɳɳ/ɵɴ), p. ɶ. 
ɶ The UN Convention on Accession to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters was opened for signature at the ɵth Conference of Ministers of Environment in Århus on ɳɶ June ɲɺɺɹ. 
The convention entered into force on ɴɱ October ɳɱɱɲ. It is available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm (most 
recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). The EU and all its member states have acceded to the convention. Information on the status 
of ratifi cation is available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratifi cation.html (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɷ For instance, the United Kingdom made a declaration upon signature of the Århus Convention that, while it understands 
the references to the right to express an aspiration that motivated the negotiation of that convention, the legal rights that 
each party thereto undertakes to guarantee under Article ɲ are limited to procedural rights. Declarations and reservations 
are available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratifi cation.html (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɸ Report by J.H. Knox (see Note ɵ), p. ɸ.
ɹ See, e.g., ECHR ɳɶ.ɵ.ɲɺɸɹ, Tyrer v. The United Kingdom (application ɶɹɶɷ/ɸɳ), para. ɴɲ.
ɺ See, e.g., ECHR [Grand Chamber] ɹ.ɸ.ɳɱɱɴ, Hatton and others v. The United Kingdom (application No. ɴɷɱɳɳ/ɺɸ), paras 
ɺɷ and ɲɳɳ.
ɲɱ ECHR ɳɳ.ɶ.ɳɱɱɴ, Kyrtatos v. Greece (application ɵɲɷɷɷ/ɺɹ), paras ɶɳ–ɶɴ.
ɲɲ See, e.g., ECJ ɳɴ.ɳ.ɲɺɺɵ, C-ɳɴɷ/ɺɳ, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia 
and others, para. ɹ.
ɲɳ See ECJ ɴɱ.ɶ.ɲɺɺɲ, C-ɴɷɲ/ɹɹ, Commission v. Germany; ɴɱ.ɶ.ɲɺɺɲ, C-ɶɺ/ɹɺ, Commission v. Germany; ɲɸ.ɲɱ.ɲɺɺɲ, C-ɶɹ/ɹɺ, 
Commission v. Germany; ɳɶ.ɸ.ɳɱɱɹ, C-ɳɴɸ/ɱɸ, Janecek v. Freistaat Bayern.
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unconditional and suﬃ  ciently precise environmental protection requirements, especially the nature pro-
tection provisions. However, it seems unlikely that the criterion of ‘being concerned’ would be interpreted 
restrictively by the Court.*13 
The direct applicability of certain environmental quality requirements set forth in the directives does 
not mean that the Court has recognised a subjective material environmental right. The aim behind the 
doctrine of direct eﬀ ect of directives is to ensure legal integration and eﬀ ectiveness of EU law, which also 
underpinned the Court’s original articulation of the direct eﬀ ect of treaty provisions. However, EU law 
would certainly play an important role in any national attempt to defi ne a material environmental right, by 
setting out the minimum requirements for many aspects of environmental quality. 
1.2. Constitutional provisions for the environment 
Unlike the majority of modern constitutions in this respect*14, the Constitution of the Estonian Republic*15 
does not explicitly recognise a subjective right to environment. Section 5 sets out that the natural wealth 
and resources of Estonia are national riches that must be used sustainably. This is a general provision that 
underscores the value of the environment and is considered to form the basis for a duty of the state to protect 
the environment.*16 The fi rst sentence of §53 stipulates that everyone has a duty to preserve the human and 
natural environment and to compensate for harm that he or she has caused to the environment. Whilst this is 
a provision for a fundamental duty, its ambiguous wording casts doubt on whether it has any direct eﬀ ect.*17 
The lack of explicit reference to an environmental right does not mean that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion were not concerned about environmental impacts on human life. In the fi nal year of existence of the 
Soviet Union (1991), the Constitutional Assembly (also ‘the Assembly’ below) was formed and tasked with 
drafting of the Constitution.*18 An environmental right was debated on several occasions during the discus-
sions by the Assembly*19, and the fi rst ‘fi nal’ draft that was made public, in late 1991, explicitly recognised 
the right to a healthy environment.*20 That right was later edited out. The reasons for this decision are not 
clear, because the minutes of the meetings are incomplete. In the earlier discussions, some drafters voiced 
a concern that the right was too ambiguous.*21 The decision may also have been infl uenced by somewhat 
naïve thinking (in retrospect) that the emphasis must instead be on the fundamental environmental duty, 
because after privatisation of industry the state no longer has an important role in controlling environmen-
tal pollution.*22 Although the reference to a healthy environment was deleted, the right to health protection 
was retained in the Constitution as adopted: the fi rst sentence of §28 states that everyone is entitled to 
protection of his or her health. 
The Århus Convention, which Estonia ratifi ed in 2001, had a signifi cant impact on Estonian legal think-
ing about environmental rights, including the basic environmental right. Some authors proposed that the 
ɲɴ The court is clearly in favour of enabling the public to play an active role in environmental protection in disputes with Mem-
ber States, as can be seen from the decisions on interpretation of provisions of directives that implement access to justice 
requirements of the Århus Convention. For examples, see ECJ ɲɲ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɴ, C-ɳɷɱ/ɲɲ, David Edwards, Lilian Pallikaropou-
los v. Environment Agency, First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀ airs; ECJ 
ɲɷ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɶ, C-ɶɸɱ/ɲɴ, Karoline Gruber v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für Kärnten, EMA Beratungs- und Handels 
GmbH, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend. 
ɲɵ D.R. Boyd. The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment. 
Vancouver: UBC Press ɳɱɲɳ, pp. ɵɸ, ɶɺ.
ɲɶ Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus. – RT I, ɲɶ.ɶ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɳ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/ɶɳɲɱɶɳɱɲɶɱɱɲ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɲɷ Ü. Madise et al. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Commentary on the Constitution of the Estonian 
Republic’]. Tallinn: Juura ɳɱɲɳ, pp. ɹɹ–ɹɺ.
ɲɸ Ibid., p. ɵɹɺ.
ɲɹ For an overview of the formation of the assembly and the drafting process, see I. Hallaste. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse sünd 
[‘The birth of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia’]. – Juridica ɲɺɺɷ (IX), pp. ɵɴɹ–ɵɵɳ. 
ɲɺ Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee. Koguteos [‘The Constitution and Constitutional Assembly, Unabridged Edition’]. 
Tallinn: Juura, Õigusteabe AS ɲɺɺɸ. See, e.g., pp. ɵɳɸ, ɵɴɱ, ɵɴɵ, ɵɹɴ–ɵɹɺ.
ɳɱ Section ɴɷ of the draft set out that ‘[e]veryone has a right to health protection and to a healthy work and living environment. 
Every person, agency, undertaking, and organisation has the duty to compensate for harm done to the natural and living 
environment by illegal acts’. Draft Constitution of ɲɴth December ɲɺɺɲ of the Constitutional Assembly. Ibid., p. ɲɳɱɸ.
ɳɲ See, e.g., the statements of V. Rumessen, J. Adams, and I. Hallaste. Ibid. (on pages ɵɸɱ, ɵɹɷ, and ɵɹɸ, respectively).
ɳɳ For examples, see the statements of T. Käbin and A. Tarand. Ibid. (on p. ɵɴɴ and pp. ɵɹɴ–ɵɹɵ, respectively).
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basic right can be derived from the Constitution even in the absence of express reference to such a right. 
According to one of the more articulate opinions, the duty set out in §53 of the Constitution includes the 
state and, also, a state duty that serves individuals’ interests and is formulated in the chapter on basic rights 
has to give rise to a subjective right.*23 I too am of the opinion that it is possible to derive the right from the 
state duty and that recognising that right would be in the spirit of the Constitution. The enforceability of 
the right would probably be limited in consequence of its indeterminate nature; nonetheless, recognition of 
the basic right would have important symbolic value and it would infl uence the interpretation of provisions 
of ordinary laws, especially procedural requirements.*24 However, there is no general agreement as to the 
existence or the exact constitutional basis of the right.*25 
The lack of explicit reference to an environmental right in the Constitution did not deter some admin-
istrative courts from recognising that right in order to allow standing before the court. According to §15 of 
the Constitution and §44 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure*26, the right of action is based on 
the protection of subjective rights. Violation of subjective rights is understood in light of the protective norm 
theory. According to that theory, a violation of a provision of public law results in violation of a person’s 
subjective right only when the violated provision protects the person’s interest. In the decision on whether 
a person has a subjective right, both the aim with the violated norm and the weight of the person’s interest 
must be considered.*27 
In legal practice, it would have been diﬃ  cult for the complainant to demonstrate a violation of a tradi-
tional subjective right, such as a right to ownership. Therefore, some courts, especially the Tallinn Circuit 
Court, took the position that standing can stem directly from a violation of the basic environmental right.*28 
The Tallinn Circuit Court has held that, on account of §5 of the Constitution, ‘there is no real reason to 
doubt that the Constitution imposes a duty to protect the environment on the state and on the agencies of 
a local municipality. The duty not just is objective but creates a subjective right to demand from the public 
authority the preservation of the environment at least in the event that it aﬀ ects one’s living environment’. 
The Court reasoned that it is evident from the Constitution that the state duty is imposed for the benefi t of 
every inhabitant of Estonia. Also, §10 of the Constitution encourages recognition of new rights,*29 especially 
if those rights are generally accepted in the European region, such as the right referred to in Article 1 of the 
Århus Convention. It should be noted also that the right is recognised in many other national constitutions 
and that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights requires a high level of environmental protection.*30 
The subjective basi c right was not recognised by all courts.*31 It is important to note that the Supreme 
Court neither acknowledged nor denied the existence of the right for a long time. Instead, the Supreme 
Court extended standing in connection with environmental matters in 2007 by allowing fi ling of complaints 
not only on the basis of a violation of a subjective right but also on the basis of being directly concerned – 
i.e., on the basis of certain interests.*32 The legal basis for the exceptional standing and its extent were not 
ɳɴ A. Andersson, T. Kolk. The role of basic rights in environmental protection: Basic right to environment de lege ferenda in 
the Estonian Constitution. – Juridica International ɳɱɱɴ (VIII), pp. ɲɵɸ–ɲɵɹ.
ɳɵ I have expressed my views on the matter in a now somewhat outdated article written in Estonian: K. Relve. Füüsiliste isikute 
subjektiivne õigus ja põhjendatud huvi keskkonnasjades [‘The subjective right and legitimate interests of natural persons in 
environmental matters’]. – Juridica ɳɱɱɵ (I), pp. ɳɱ–ɴɲ. 
ɳɶ For instance, the notion that a subjective right can simply arise from a state duty has been criticised. L Kanger. Kas EV 
põhiseaduses sisaldub õigus puhtale keskkonnale [‘Does the Estonian Constitution include a right to a healthy environ-
ment?’]. – Akadeemia ɳɱɱɸ/ɲɲ. 
ɳɷ Halduskohtumenetluse seadustik. – RT I, ɳɴ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɲ, ɴ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
en/eli/ɶɱɷɱɵɳɱɲɷɱɱɲ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɳɸ SCSCd ɳɱ.ɲɳ. ɳɱɱɱ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɲɶ-ɱɲ, para. ɳɳ.
ɳɹ See, e.g., Tallinn CCd ɲɶ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɱɵ, ɳ-ɴ/ɲɵɱ/ɱɵ; Tallinn CCr ɲɴ.ɹ.ɳɱɱɸ, ɴ-ɱɸ-ɲɱɳ; Tallinn CCd ɲɹ.ɴ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɲɴɷ; Tallinn 
CCd ɳɷ.ɷ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɹɹ.
ɳɺ Section ɲɱ of the Constitution stipulates: ‘The rights, freedoms and duties set out in the chapter of basic rights and obliga-
tions do not preclude other rights, freedoms and duties which arise from the spirit of the Constitution or are in accordance 
therewith, and which are in conformity with the principles of human dignity, social justice and democratic government 
founded on the rule of law.’
ɴɱ Tallinn CCd ɲɹ.ɴ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɲɴɷ, paras ɹ–ɲɱ.
ɴɲ See, e.g., the overview of the relevant practice of administrative courts until ɳɱɱɷ oﬀ ered by K. Vaarmari. Keskkonnaalane 
subjektiivne õigus Eesti kohtupraktikas [‘The subjective environmental right in Estonian court practice’]. – Juridica ɳɱɱɸ 
(VII).
ɴɳ ALCSCd ɳɹ.ɳ.ɳɱɱɸ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɹɷ-ɱɷ, para. ɲɷ. 
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clear, although the Court explicitly denied actio popularis.*33 However, in 2010 the Supreme Court fi nally 
tackled the question of the existence of a basic environmental right. The Court held that the environment is 
an important value for everyone but that an enforceable independent subjective environmental right cannot 
be derived directly from §§ 5 and 55. In the Court’s opinion, a right to a clean environment can emerge as 
an independent subjective right if the criteria for such an environment and everyone’s obligation to toler-
ate environmental impacts can be fi xed in the law. Currently the legal criteria are manifestly inadequate for 
determining the extent to which the right can be protected.*34 
1.3. The relationship of the GPECA’s §23 
with the legal framework and court practice
Estonian environmental law has been in the process of codifi cation since 2007. The process involves not just 
the consolidation and systematisation of existing law but also a critical review of the law, tackling of con-
tradictions, and bridging of gaps; in other words, the codifi cation is substantive.*35 The General Part of the 
 Environmental Code was adopted in 2011; however, the special part of the code has not been completed yet.*36
The subjective right to environment is set out in the GPECA’s §23. The link with the Århus Convention 
is obvious from the wording of the name of the right – referring to a right to an environment that meets 
health and well-being needs – which is almost identical to the formulation of the right in the Estonian trans-
lation of the convention. However, according to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft 
GPECA, the intention was to set out a material right*37 rather than provide only procedural guarantees.
The explanatory memorandum states that the aim in stipulating the GPECA’s §23 is to specify the basic 
right that has been recognised in court practice.*38 This statement may appear puzzling since the Supreme 
Court had rejected the right in 2010. The apparent contradiction can be explained through examination of the 
timeline of codifi cation. Initially the code was intended to be adopted as a unifi ed entity; however, because 
of the approaching 2011 general elections, consultations on the draft GPECA began on 13 May 2010.*39 The 
Supreme Court delivered the judgement in June after the consultation process. Parliamentary proceedings 
were initiated on 13 September 2010.*40 The Parliament was aware of the decision; however, it did not alter 
the wording of §23. It should be noted that the Parliament too was under time pressure because of the impend-
ing elections. The GPECA was adopted on 28 February 2011, and the general election was held in March. 
2. Elements of the subjective 
environment right in the GPECA
2.1. The concept of environment
The GPECA’s §23 entitles everyone to a certain environment but does not defi ne the concept of ‘environ-
ment’. No universal legal defi nition of this concept exists; the elements of conventional defi nitions depend 
on the aims of the legislator.*41 In the broadest sense, the term signifi es surroundings, including social 
ɴɴ Ibid. Note that the practice was discontinued in ɳɱɲɶ on account of the entry into force of the GPECA’s §ɳɴ. See ALCSCr 
ɲɴ.ɶ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɹ-ɲɶ, paras ɲɺ–ɳɲ.
ɴɵ ALCSCr ɲɹ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɱ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɲɱɲ-ɱɺ, para. ɲɴ.
ɴɶ See the explanatory memorandum to the GPECA, p. ɳ. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems&ems
help=true&eid=ɲɲɵɸɳɹɳ&u=ɳɱɲɲɱɷɲɷɲɹɳɸɲɷ (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ) (in Estonian).
ɴɷ At the time of writing of this article, in March ɳɱɲɷ, the majority of the codifi ed specifi c laws, such as the Water Act, are still 
in the draft stage. The deadline for the completion of the Special Part has been postponed several times.
ɴɸ See the memorandum referred to in Note ɴɶ, p. ɳɺ.
ɴɹ Ibid., pp. ɳɺ–ɴɱ.
ɴɺ Letter of the Minister of Justice of ɲɴ.ɶ.ɳɱɲɱ, No. ɲɱ.ɳ-ɲ/ɸɴɵɷ. Available at http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main#ICKKooSf 
(most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ) (in Estonian).
ɵɱ Information on the parliamentary proceedings for the draft is available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/
aɲcafcɳɸ-ɳfɱɳ-ɵɵɹd-ɹɶɱɺ-ɹeɺfaɴɲɳaɲɳɺ/ (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ) (in Estonian).
ɵɲ See, e.g., F. Fracchia. The legal defi nition of environment: From rights to duties. Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. ɱɷ-ɱɺ, ɳɱɱɶ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɳɲɴɺ/ssrn.ɹɶɱɵɹɹ.
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and psychological elements. The focus of the GPECA is not so broad, which is evident from several of the 
act’s provisions, especially the defi nitions of ‘environmental information’ and ‘environmental organisation’. 
The defi nitions indicate that the term ‘environment’ has to be interpreted broadly but is limited to physi-
cal phenomena. The term undoubtedly encompasses natural environment, such as forests or ambient air. 
More controversial, in contrast, is the extent to which it covers the built environment. According to the 
explanatory memorandum, the term should be taken to encompass the elements of human-created envi-
ronment that are similar to the natural environment, such as city parks*42 but the extent of the right should 
be clarifi ed in the process of codifi cation of building and planning law. Codifi cation of these areas of law 
was completed in 2015*43, but, regrettably, this has not resulted in any signifi cant clarifi cation of the scope 
of the GPECA’s §23.*44
2.2. The concept of health and well-being needs
The GPECA’s §23 is titled ‘Right to environment that meets health and well-being needs’. These needs are 
not defi ned in the GPECA. The concept is vaguely outlined in the explanatory memorandum, which empha-
sises that the Parliament ought to discuss its limits.*45 It appears that no such discussion took place. In any 
case, the wording of the provision was not altered.
The question of which needs are worthy of protection is not easy to answer. Inter alia, this can be seen 
in the discontinued practice of the Supreme Court by which standing was allowed on the basis of certain 
interest. The last relevant case pertained to the potential impacts of extracting sand from the seabed. The 
person who brought the action lived about two kilometres from the planned extraction site and was a fi sh-
erman. The court panel was divided on the question of whether an important interest was at stake for this 
person.*46  
In this context it may be useful to consider which kinds of environmental interests are protected by 
environmental law in general. Brennan van Dyke has divided such interests into three categories: 1) the 
right to inviolable integrity of the person, including the person’s physical being and the person’s property; 
2) aesthetic sensibilities and recreation interests of humans; and 3) the interests of future generations and 
well-being of non-human life.*47 If only the fi rst category is included, what the GPECA’s §23 provides for 
would resemble a traditional basic right. The problem is that it would be diﬃ  cult to distinguish this from 
other traditional rights, such as the right to life, health, property, or one’s home. If, on the other hand, all 
three categories are included, then the right would encompass some interests that clearly are not subjec-
tive interests of the person. Therefore, I suggest that an independent subjective right should cover the fi rst 
two categories of interests but not the third. Moreover, it should be recalled that the drafters of the GPECA 
sought to codify the existing court practice, which allowed extensive standing in relation to environmental 
matters while rejecting the idea of actio popularis. If the GPECA’s §23 encompassed only the fi rst category 
of interests, it would probably not lead to a liberal approach to standing, while including all the categories 
would allow actio popularis. 
According to the commentaries on the GPECA,*48 the understanding as to which ‘well-being needs ’ are 
worthy of protection changes over time and depends on the development of the relevant society and the 
means available to it. In principle, a person should be protected from environmental nuisances that do not 
ɵɳ Memorandum (see Note ɴɶ), p. ɴɱ. Note that the earlier practice of the Circuit Court of Tallinn was focused on the issue 
of whether members of the public have standing in relation to a matter to do with construction in a ‘green space’ within a 
built-up area, such as a city park. See, for instance, Tallinn CCd, ɳɷ.ɷ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɹɹ.
ɵɴ Planeerimisseadus (the Planning Act) was adopted on ɳɹ January ɳɱɲɶ. – RT I, ɳɷ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɴ. Ehitusseadustik (the Building 
Code) was adopted on ɲɲ February ɳɱɲɶ. – RT I, ɶ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɲ.
ɵɵ For instance, the Planning Act’s §ɹ stipulates the principle of improving the living environment, which could be relevant 
in interpreting GPECA’s section. However, the act and its explanatory memorandum (at ɳɱɱ pages) do not directly refer to 
GPECA’s §ɳɴ. 
ɵɶ Memorandum (see Note ɴɶ), p. ɴɱ.
ɵɷ ALCSCr ɲɴ.ɶ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɹ-ɲɶ, para. ɲɷ. Dissenting opinion of judges I. Pilving and J. Põld.
ɵɸ B. van Dyke. Proposal to introduce the right to a healthy environment into the European Convention regime. – Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal, ɲɺɺɵ/ɳ, p. ɴɴɱ.
ɵɹ O. Kask et al. Keskkonnaseadustiku üldosa seaduse kommentaarid. ɳ., täiendatud väljaanne [‘Commentaries on the General 
Part of the Environmental Code Act., ɳnd Updated Edition’), ɳɱɲɶ. Available at http://media.voog.com/ɱɱɱɱ/ɱɱɴɷ/ɶɷɸɸ/
fi les/KeYS_kommentaarid_ɳɱɲɶ.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).  
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result in damage to health but are nonetheless disturbing even if the relevant limit values are not exceeded. 
Impairment in respect of a ‘well-being need’ may also consist in deprivation of something, such as light 
(due to the height of neighbouring buildings), water (as in the case of drying up of a well in consequence 
of mining activities), or access to green areas or the environment in general on the basis of ‘everyman’s 
right’.*49 The cautious position taken in the commentary allows interpreting the GPECA’s §23 in terms of 
the fi rst category of interests: most of the examples consider issues that would be within the scope of tradi-
tional rights if the rights were interpreted broadly. In my view, the concept of ‘health and well-being needs’ 
should also include individuals’ recreation- and aesthetics-related environmental interests. For instance, a 
birdwatcher, a hiker, a nature photographer, or a botanist studying particular plants should be able to rely 
on the right in principle. 
The very limited court practice of application of the GPECA’s §23 appears to indicate that the notion of 
‘health and well-being needs’ is interpreted broadly. The Tallinn Circuit Court has taken the position that 
cutting down fi ve trees and building a car park in a yard may, in principle, aﬀ ect the right of a city resident 
living in the house to which the yard belongs.*50 In another case, that court seemed to accept that using a 
rec reation area in a forest near a town is a health and well-being need of the residents of the town.*51 
2.3. The criterion of signifi cant connection
The fi rst para grap h of the GPECA’s §23 stipulates that a person has the relevant right only if he or she has 
a signifi cant connection with the aﬀ ected environment. According to the second paragraph, a person has 
a signifi cant connection with the environment if that person often stays in the aﬀ ected environment, often 
uses the aﬀ ected natural resource, or otherwise has a special connection with the aﬀ ected environment.
The provision is formulated on the basis of the earlier court practice.*52 In several decisions, the Tal-
linn Circuit Court has used the following formula: ‘Environmental impact has personal scope, whether 
or not other basic rights are aﬀ ected, if the relevant person has used the aﬀ ected environmental resource 
habitually, if that person often stays in said environment, or if the person has a stronger connection with the 
environment than the rest of the public or the well-being of that person is otherwise signifi cantly aﬀ ected 
by the environmental impact.’*53 In these cases, the court had to determine which members of the p ublic 
had standing in relation to an act that aﬀ ected public green areas, such as a public city park. In the court’s 
view, the living environment of a person includes at least the public space close to that person’s home, espe-
cially parks and green areas, and also areas where the person habitually spends his or her leisure time. The 
formula was meant to allow broad standing but avoid actio popularis. In other words, when the concept of 
‘health and well-being needs’ is interpreted broadly, many people may have an interest in the matter. The 
requirement of signifi cant connection should be understood as a fi lter for determination of which persons 
are more aﬀ ected than others. 
A person is more aﬀ ected if using the environment often. The GPECA does not specify how frequent or 
intense the use must be. In any case, the person must prove that he or she uses the relevant environment 
frequently. In the pre-GPECA court practice, living close to the aﬀ ected environment was considered suf-
fi cient proof.*54 This seems to be the case also in the limited court practice of application of the GPECA’s 
§23.*55 ‘Additionally, ‘signifi cant connection’ can be established on a basis other than use: any ‘special con-
nection’ would be enough. The GPECA does not specify the meaning of ‘special connection’. According to 
commentary on the act, it could consist of scientifi c interest, religious views, or ownership of the aﬀ ected 
environment.*56 
ɵɺ Ibid., pp. ɲɳɶ–ɲɳɷ. The terms of this right are set out primarily in the GPECA’s §§ ɴɳ–ɴɺ and, in principle, allow every person 
to use private land and water. This includes use for certain economic activities, such as berry-picking.
ɶɱ Tallinn CCr ɳɶ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɴ-ɲɶ-ɲɳɷɷ, para. ɲɲ.
ɶɲ Tallinn CCr ɲɷ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɴ-ɲɶ-ɳɴɵɳ, para. ɺ.
ɶɳ Memorandum (see Note ɴɶ), p. ɴɲ.
ɶɴ Tallinn CCr ɲɴ.ɹ.ɳɱɱɸ, ɴ-ɱɸ-ɲɱɳ, para. ɲɶ; Tallinn CCd ɲɹ.ɴ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɲɴɷ, para. ɲɱ; Tallinn CCd ɳɷ.ɷ.ɳɱɱɹ, ɴ-ɱɷ-ɲɹɹ, 
para. ɲɶ.
ɶɵ Ibid., in paras ɲɸ, ɲɳ, and ɲɷ, respectively.  
ɶɶ Judgements of Tallinn Circuit Court (see notes ɶɱ and ɶɲ), in paras ɲɲ and ɺ, respectively.
ɶɷ See the commentary on the GPECA (see Note ɵɹ), p. ɲɳɸ.
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The wording of the GPECA’s §23 raises the question of whether it is enough simply to prove the existence 
of a signifi cant connection without demonstrating impairment in relation to meeting a particular health and 
well-being need. In my opinion, the second element has to be demonstrated in principle but its existence can 
often be presumed. If a link to needs need not be made, individuals could eﬀ ectively protect any interest, not 
merely personal interests. For example, if a person habitually walks in a park, his or her right may be aﬀ ected 
if the walking paths are rendered inaccessible by building of a drainage system, whereas the right cannot be 
aﬀ ected if the drainage system does not aﬀ ect walking but destroys a habitat of a protected plant species. The 
eﬀ ect on health and well-being needs also has to be taken into account in the decision on what constitutes a 
signifi cant connection. For instance, the more severe air pollution is, the less time a person has to stay in the 
aﬀ ected area before being considered to have a signifi cant connection with the aﬀ ected environment. 
In summary, the criterion of signifi cant connection means that impairment of meeting of a need can be 
generally presumed if the person proves frequent use of the aﬀ ected environment. In the event of doubt, a 
link must be established with a health and well-being need; however, there is no requirement set forth in 
the GPECA for demonstrating that the impairment is serious, obvious, etc.
2.4. The concept of affected environment
According to the second and third paragraph of the GPECA’s §23, a person must have a signifi cant connec-
tion with an aﬀ ected environment or one likely to be aﬀ ected. The concept is related primarily to the causal 
relationship of an administrative act or measure with negative consequences. The wording is problematic 
for two reasons: it does not expressly provide ex ante protection, and it may be misleading with respect to 
the negative eﬀ ects of the act or measure. 
The causal relationships can be complicated in environmental matters. Disputes often revolve about 
the existence or extent of negative impacts that may result from an administrative act, such as granting of 
an environmental permit. The wording of the GPECA’s §23 may give an impression that the right aﬀ ords 
protection only if the environment has actually been aﬀ ected and not in cases of potential negative impacts. 
However, the provision needs to be read in conjunction with other provisions of the GPECA, such as its 
statement of the precautionary principle (§11), which stipulates that in environmental decision-making the 
impacts of the decisions have to be identifi ed and the risks have to be reduced to the maximum extent pos-
sible by means of appropriate precautionary measures.
The negative eﬀ ects of an administrative act or measure also do not necessarily have to manifest them-
selves in changes to nature, but this fact is not clearly refl ected in the wording of the GPECA’s §23. For 
example, the courts have had to rule on whether a restriction to the use of a recreational area in a forest 
may aﬀ ect the right to an environment that meets health and well-being needs. Access to one such area was 
going to be restricted on as many as 90 days a year in order to ensure that nearby military exercises did not 
pose a threat to the public. The Tallinn Circuit Court was of the opinion that only actual extensive destruc-
tion of the forest could result in infringement of the right and that such destruction was very unlikely.*57 In 
my opinion, the court was misled by the wording of the GPECA’s §23, which requires signifi cant connection 
with the aﬀ ected environment. While the forest was not aﬀ ected in the sense that it would be destroyed, 
the court did not consider that restrictions on the use of such a recreation area are similar to destruction 
of the forest in their consequence with regard to health and well-being needs: in both cases, the persons 
concerned cannot use the area for recreational purposes. It is my opinion that the right was aﬀ ected and the 
court ought to have determined whether the restrictions to the use of the area were justifi ed. 
2.5. The required quality of the environment 
According to the fourth paragraph of the GPECA’s §23, the rights of other persons, public interests, and the 
characteristics of the region are to be taken into account in assessment of how well the environment meets 
health and well-being needs. The non-compliance of the environment with health and well-being needs is 
presumed if a limit value set for the quality of the environment has been exceeded.
The wording of the paragraph is confusing: it is unclear whether it addresses the scope of the right or 
instead its limitations. One must assume that the fi rst sentence lists the general criteria to be taken into 
ɶɸ See the judgement referred to in Note ɴɱ, para. ɺ. 
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account in limiting of the right, because the rights of other persons or public interest cannot directly deter-
mine the scope of another right.
The paragraph oﬀ ers very little guidance as to the contents of the right: the provision refers only to limit 
values for the quality of the environment. The defi nition of this term is provided in the third paragraph of the 
GPECA’s §7: ‘Limit value of the quality of the environment’ means a limit value established for a chemical, 
physical, or biological indicator where, for the purpose of protecting human health and the environment, that 
value must not be exceeded. In other words, the quality of the environment is considered to be inadequate 
in the case of exceeding of a binding quality-limit value that is relevant for protection of meeting of a health 
or well-being need. We are unfortunate in that it is not necessarily obvious which indicators are limit values 
for the quality of the environment. Even if an indicator can be associated with health and well-being needs, it 
may not qualify because it is not strictly binding. Consider, for instance, the long-term objectives for ozone. 
There is no defi nitive date for achieving the objectives; what is stated in the Air Framework Directive is that if 
the long-term objectives are met, the Member States must, in principle, ‘maintain those levels below the long-
term objectives and shall preserve through proportionate measures the best ambient air quality compatible 
with sustainable development and a high level of environmental and human health protection’.*58 Also, while 
there are numerous limit values, many aspects of environmental quality are not covered by limit values and 
some elements of it cannot be regulated by way of limit values, such as odours or access to green areas. 
The inadequacy of an environment that exceeds limit values is only presumed. It is not clear under 
what circumstances higher environmental quality has to be guaranteed or lower quality has to be accepted. 
It could be argued that the provision allows taking an individual person’s special needs into account. For 
instance, if a small percentage of the human population is less tolerant of noise, it could be argued that the 
persons belonging to this segment of the population have a need for reduction in nightly noise. However, 
this does not seem to be supported by the wording of the name given to the right. Unlike Article 1 of the 
Århus Convention, the GPECA’s §23 refers to an environment that is adequate not for meeting the needs 
of the rights-holder but for meeting of needs in general. This implies that the environment must meet the 
needs of an average person.
It is apparent from the relevant draft materials that the GPECA’s §23 was not intended to be so ambigu-
ous. According to the notes on the conception of the GPECA, the right was to be formulated in broad terms 
but integrated with the specifi c regulation in the special part of the code.*59 When the GPECA was adopted, 
in 2011, it was intended to enter into force at the same time as the special part (see §63). However, with the 
completion of the special part taking much longer than expected, a decision was taken in 2014 to bring the 
GPECA into force *60 before the next general election, in 2015. Consequently, the GPECA’s §23 is not inte-
grated with specifi c regulation in sector-specifi c environmental law, although such a link can be established 
in the future. 
In my view, the vagueness of the GPECA’s §23 does not necessarily mean that it is devoid of content and 
unenforceable beyond the terms on certain quality-limit values. Any legal provision that sets out a require-
ment related to the environment could be considered to defi ne an acceptable level for the environment. 
Consider the case of a building permit being issued for construction of a manure-storage facility within the 
water-protection zone. It could be argued that the provisions of the Water Act and the Nature Protection 
Act that clearly forbid such construction dictate that this is not an acceptable change in the environment. 
Any person who intensively uses the river for fi shing or recreational purposes could contest the permit on 
the basis that it violates his or her right to environment. In cases wherein a public authority has discretion – 
e.g., that of a decision on whether a building may be constructed in a green area of a city – it could be argued 
that the GPECA’s §23 requires such decisions to take into account the potential uses of the environment by 
the public and balance them against other interests. If such consideration is not carried out, this omission 
could be grounds for annulling the decision. However, by dint of the ambiguity of the right and the principle 
of separation of powers, the courts should quash the decision only if the error in the application of discre-
tion is evident. This was the approach taken by the Tallinn Circuit Court in its earlier practice. That court 
ɶɹ Article ɲɹ of Directive ɳɱɱɹ/ɶɱ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɲ May ɳɱɱɹ, OJ L ɲɶɳ/ɲ.
ɶɺ Keskkonnaseadustiku üldosa seaduse kontseptsioon [‘Concept of the General Part of the Environmental Code’], Tallinn ɳɱɱɹ 
(in Estonian). Available at http://www.just.ee/sites/www.just.ee/fi les/elfi nder/article_fi les/keskkonnaseadustiku_uldosa_
seaduse_kontseptsioon_ɳɱɱɹ_ɲ.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ), p. ɷɱ.
ɷɱ See the explanatory memorandum to the implementing act for the GPECA. Available at http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/
main#ɷfɶUGrFg (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ), p. ɲ. 
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held that the basic right does not preclude changes in the environment. However, in making the relevant 
decisions, the public authority has to involve persons whose living environment is aﬀ ected, must specify the 
motivation for the decision, and may allow adverse changes only for imperative reasons.*61
2.6. Remedies
A right that in theory is extensive has little practical value if its enforceability is limited. The fi fth paragraph 
of the GPECA’s §23 stipulates that to uphold the right one can demand that the administrative authority 
preserve the environment and take reasonable measures to ensure that the environment is in line with 
the health and well-being needs. The provision clearly indicates that the right is meant to be enforceable. 
This is evident also from the fi rst paragraph of §30, which states that the violation of the right is subject to 
 administrative review and administrative court review. 
The articulation of the right to demand preservation of the environment resembles the wording for 
the fundamental duty set out in §53 of the Constitution, which requires avoiding harmful action.*62 It is 
not fully clear whether the demand for preservation in the context of GPECA’s §23 may include measures 
by public authorities to prevent or mitigate damage arising through actions of third parties. In general, the 
demand to take active measures, such as improvement of access to green areas, is limited to reasonable 
measures. The reference could be understood as dealing with the necessity of giving special consideration 
to the burden of action on the public authority and the eﬀ ectiveness of the action in ensuring the right.*63 It 
refl ects the need for caution in requiring positive action in a situation in which it is unclear what quality of 
environment is acceptable in ensuring the right.
The GPECA’s §23 does not allow directly contesting the actions of private persons, because demands 
may be addressed only to public authorities.*64 However, actions of public authorities often have immediate 
consequences for third parties – e.g., contesting the decision to issue an environmental permit aﬀ ects the 
holder of the permit. Also, measures for improving the environment may entail obligations of private indi-
viduals. For instance, in order to reduce nightly noise in a neighbourhood, the local government may amend 
the regulations on night clubs or require actions from certain individual pub-owners. According to the com-
mentary on the GPECA, the right of a public authority to demand actions by third parties cannot be based 
on the GPECA’s §23 and has to be derived from other provisions.*65 Consequently the public authority may 
eﬀ ectively be rendered unable to take measures that are considered reasonable for ensuring the right.
2.7. The Supreme Court’s criteria for an 
environmental right and the GPECA’s §23 
According to the Supreme Court, an independent subjective environmental right can emerge when criteria 
for such an environment and everyone’s obligation to tolerate environmental impacts can be fi xed in the 
law. Currently the legal criteria are manifestly inadequate for determining the extent to which the right may 
be protected.*66 
The scope and contents of the GPECA’s §23 are remarkably ambiguous and do not clarify the relevant 
legal criteria; i.e., the provision fails the test of the Supreme Court. A possible exception is to be found in 
certain quality-limit values that are designed for the protection of public health. It would be diﬃ  cult to argue 
that with these values too the aim is not the protection of individual-level interests or that none of the values 
are suﬃ  ciently detailed. However, the values are set out not in the GPECA but in specifi c environmental 
acts, which existed at the time of the decision of the Supreme Court. In my view, this probably means that 
the Supreme Court considers the values not to be encompassed by an independent right to environment 
but, rather, to be one aspect of the right to health protection, which is specifi ed in §28 of the Constitution. 
ɷɲ See the judgement referred to in Note ɴɱ, para. ɲɲ.
ɷɳ See the commentary on the Constitution (Note ɲɷ), p. ɵɺɱ.
ɷɴ See the commentary on the GPECA (Note ɵɹ), p. ɲɴɶ.
ɷɵ Actions against private persons can be brought to a limited extent under private law. For instance, according to §ɲɵɴ of the 
Law of Property Act, one could, in principle, prohibit neighbours from causing non-material environmental nuisances. 
ɷɶ See the commentary on the GPECA (Note ɵɹ), p. ɲɴɶ.
ɷɷ ALCSCr ɲɹ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɱ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɲɱɲ-ɱɺ, para. ɲɴ.
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This right, as are other social and economic rights, is often viewed as amounting to little more than aspi-
rational rhetoric.*67 The Estonian Supreme Court has rejected this view but has emphasised that judicial 
protection of the right to health protection is limited to the core of the right. The extent of the right depends, 
inter alia, on the economic capability of the state, and the judiciary shall not replace the legislative or execu-
tive powers in exercising of social policy.*68 So far, the focus of the court review by the Supreme Court has 
been on the right to health care and state assistance, not environmental aspects of the right. However, it 
is commonly held that the right includes underlying determinants for health, such as environmental con-
ditions.*69 Also, the Supreme Court has been innovative in interpreting basic rights so as to accommodate 
environmental concerns, although this has met with resistance from more conservative judges.*70 
3. Conclusions
The purpose with this article has been to examine the basis of the subjective right to environ ment set out in 
the GPECA’s §23 and analyse its scope and contents to determine whether it satisfi es the criteria outlined 
by the Supreme Court for an independent subjective environmental right. 
The conclusion is that the right has no explicit basis in international, EU, or constitutional law. How-
ever, some courts, especially the Circuit Court of Tallinn, have recognised a subjective basic right to envi-
ronment. The GPECA’s §23 was intended to codify and expand the existing court practice surrounding the 
basic environmental right. Court practice changed as the legislative proceedings progressed, but the Parlia-
ment did not alter the formulation of the provision. 
The scope and contents of the right set out in the GPECA’s §23 are noteworthy for their ambiguity. This 
is a consequence of the regrettable wording for some elements of the right, the Parliament’s lack of initiative 
to discuss the extent of the right, and also the fact that the GPECA was initially designed to be not adopted 
ahead of the special part but integrated with it. Consequently, the GPECA’s §23 fails the Supreme Court’s test 
for an independent subjective environmental right, which requires fi xing the scope and content of the right 
in the law. 
The GPECA’s §23 relies on several undefi ned legal concepts. It is proposed that that term ‘environment’ 
encompasses the natural environment and elements of the built environment that are similar to the natural 
environment, such as city parks. The concept of ‘health and well-being needs’ should essentially encompass 
all individual-level environmental interests; otherwise, it cannot be distinguished from traditional rights 
or public interests. The criterion of ‘signifi cant connection’ should be understood as a fi lter for singling out 
persons whose abilities to meet their health and well-being needs are more aﬀ ected. In general, it is suﬃ  -
cient to prove the existence of this ‘signifi cant connection’, but a link must be established with a health and 
well-being need when some doubt exists. The concept of ‘aﬀ ected environment’ should not be understood 
as limiting the scope of the right to cases wherein an actual signifi cant physical change has occurred in the 
environment. 
The only express guidance as to the contents of the right comes in the somewhat vague reference to 
exceeding of a quality-limit value. However, arguably any legal provision that sets out a requirement with 
regard to the environment could be considered to defi ne the level acceptable for the environment. Also, it 
could be argued that the GPECA’s §23 requires a balancing-of-interests test in connection with any public 
environmental decision and that this use of discretion is, in principle, subject to court review. Depending on 
the viewpoint, one could consider the right therefore to be empty and unenforceable or, conversely, to allow 
enforcement of any environmental requirement that could aﬀ ect the environment that the relevant person 
extensively uses. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will construe the GPECA’s §23.
ɷɸ See, e.g., C. O’Cinneide. Constitutionalization of social and economic rights. – H.A. Garcia, K. Klare, L.A. Williams (eds). 
Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries. London: Routledge ɳɱɲɶ, p. ɳɷɶ.
ɷɹ See, e.g., ALCSCd ɲɱ.ɲɲ.ɳɱɱɴ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɷɶ-ɱɴ, para. ɲɵ; Judgement of the Supreme Court in rem ɸ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɲ, ɴ-ɵ-ɲ-ɲɳ-ɲɱ, para. 
ɶɹ.
ɷɺ See the commentary on the Constitution (see Note ɲɷ), pp. ɴɷɶ–ɴɷɷ. 
ɸɱ In a landmark decision, the court found that the right of land-ownership encompasses the interest in preserving a favourable 
status for the protected habitat of a plant species on the grounds that all plants are part of the immovable. The decision was 
not unanimous, as one of the justices considered such expansion of the right contrary to the nature of the right. ALCSCd 
ɷ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɳ, ɴ-ɴ-ɲ-ɶɷ-ɲɳ, para. ɲɲ; dissenting opinion of I. Koolmeister, paras ɲ–ɵ. 
